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George P. Smith, II*
I. LIMITATIONS ON ELDERLY ACCESS
TO MEDICAL CARE
Introduction
Health is not an absolute condition, but is assessed
by reference to age and other factors.  Therefore, a
relative scale is necessary to determine whether an
elderly person’s right to health care is being satisfied.1
Today, older Americans are increasingly affected by
the growing need to regulate health care delivery.
Since 1900, those over the age of 85 years have
become twenty-one times as numerous in society,
with an eightfold increase in the number of people
over the age of 65.2   Given the need to curb rising
health care costs — particularly the expenses related
to caring for older individuals — and improve access
to health care, society has effectuated two methods
of governing the distribution of limited health care
resources: allocation and rationing.3
Health Care Allocation and Rationing
The allocation of health care resources involves a
societal determination of what resources should be
devoted to a particular program.4   The allocation
process is typically performed on a macro level, with
allocation decisions often only affecting statistical lives
(i.e., the statistical determination of various life and
death rates arrived at based on the evaluation and
computation of numerous factors).5   In contrast to the
identifiable lives often affected by health care rationing,
statistical lives affected by allocation decisions are
much more readily sacrificed.6
A common means of deciding on health care
allocation is through political processes.  Government
decisions pertaining to health care spending and
regulation typically involve allocation determinations.
For example, the Medicare and Medicaid programs in
America allocate resources to numerous purposes.7
Hospitals, too, regularly make allocation decisions in
determining the quantity and type of resources to have
available.8   Their actions, in turn, impact directly upon
physicians who subsequently also become health
care allocators.
Whether a duty arises to the elderly citizens affected
by such allocation decisions is the subject of much
debate.  The government does arguably have a duty,
based on a collective social obligation, to help people
live out a natural life span.9   Yet, without a limit on
investments into health care for the elderly, younger
generations will suffer based on an inadequacy of
available health care resources.10   Others argue that
individuals should support health care plans
allocating fewer resources to health care in old age in
exchange for more comprehensive health care earlier
on in life.11
In broad terms, rationing commonly refers to the equitable
division of scarce items by limiting the amount individuals
are entitled to.12   Rationing of medical care is more
narrowly defined as the deliberate denial of treatment to
some individuals who might benefit from it.13   The
pervasiveness of rationing throughout the health care
industry no longer represents the deliberate, equitable
sharing of a scarce commodity.  Rather, rationing has
come to represent discrimination in access to health
care services on the basis of socioeconomic status.
Justifying Age-Based Health Care Rationing
Proponents of rationing contend that anything short
of rationing will not prevent a looming economic
catastrophe in America’s health care system.
Specifically, the proponents argue that rationing is the
only way of managing unbridled patient demand, an
aging population and the open flood gates of medical
technological developments.14   They argue that an
explicit system of rationing health care services must
be implemented to avert a national disaster.15   This
argument, however, is founded on more than mere
economic considerations.
Older persons seem particularly susceptible to
rationing efforts.  Commentators have argued that an
integral part of a rationing system is to ration care
among the elderly, thereby restricting expensive, high
technology, life-sustaining care for those who have
reached a certain age.16   Implicit in this argument is
the principle that elderly health care represents an
investment of scarce resources with limited returns.17
In addition, this argument reflects an intuitive
conclusion that an older person has less chance of
achieving a successful clinical outcome.18   The
assumption is therefore made that vast resources
are spent on care for dying elderly; an assumption
bolstered by empirical evidence.19   In further support
of age-based rationing, proponents have proffered a
wide gamut of benefits, including productivity, equality,
natural life span, intergenerational justice and medical
benefits.20
Withholding of costly medical treatment to the elderly
has been justified on the basis of waning productivity
in the later years of life.  It is an argument centering on
an investment return theory, suggesting that the dollars
spent on elderly health care may best benefit society
when invested in patients with greater ‘potential.’21
Coupled with the greater investment return argument
is the suggestion that individuals should have the
right to live until the same age as others.  As such,
health care services for the elderly should be curtailed
in order to allow for such an outcome.  By limiting
health care for the elderly, services can be provided to
allow all, to the extent possible, to reach a certain
age.22
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Justifying age-based health care rationing has also been
done on the basis of intergenerational justice and a
‘natural lifespan’ view.  The theory articulated is that health
care costs for the elderly invariably deprive younger
generations of access to adequate health care and
thereby limit their exposure to other life experiences.
Under this theory, the elderly should recognize that their
own welfare is the result of other generations’ hard work
and should therefore deem their health care needs as
inferior to those of the younger generation.23
Arguments Against Age-Based Rationing
The argument is often made that health care services
should not be rationed at all, particularly not on the
basis of age.  Proposals in support of age based
rationing do not generally advocate the withholding of
all medical treatment from older persons.  Rather,
such proposals suggests that expensive, aggressive
care should be withheld from elderly patients.24
According to one study, withholding all care for high-
cost Medicare decedents would have resulted in a
2.8 billion dollar saving in 1987.25   While withholding
high cost health care from older patients who were
seriously ill may save some money, this savings must
be balanced against the cost of ending many lives.
The consistently reappearing theme in all of the
analyses of age base rationing centers on defining
the value of an elder person’s life.  Some make the
argument that excluding older persons from
expensive medical treatment may allow society to
realize a greater return for those invested dollars.
Moreover, commentators argue that limitations on
health care to the elderly will allow for greater equality
in the number of life years attained.  Imputed from this
position is a demeaning, monetary value affixed to a
human life.  Regulating access to medical care based
on age runs against the egalitarian nature of society
and the principle that all human life is sacred and
equally deserving of protection.26
Another widely discussed justification for rationing life-
sustaining health care for the elderly is the natural
lifespan principle.27   This proposal attaches a normative
average to valuating a person’s natural lifespan
(calculated to be roughly around the late seventies or
early eighties) after which a person should receive only
supportive and palliative care.28   The goal of establishing
an acceptable age after which health care should be
rationed is an attempt at applying a homogeneous
criterion to a very heterogeneous society.  The
contributions to society made by elder citizens varies
widely and makes very difficult any attempt of valuing a
human life strictly on age and natural lifespan.  In addition,
although it is suggested that the elderly should give priority
to the health care needs of a younger generation,
intergenerational equality is a two way street.  Although
the work and contributions of the younger generation
provide for much of the older generation’s welfare, it must
not be forgotten that the sacrifices of the elderly created
many of the resources, opportunities and services that
younger generations now enjoy.29
II. THE EQUALITY OF AGE-BASED
HEALTH CARE ALLOCATION AND
RATIONING
The theory of equal medical treatment supports
implicitly the proposition that persons with similar
health conditions receive roughly the same health
care.  Given the reality of scarce medical resources,
however, society is faced with the obligation of
allocating the resources as equitably and efficiently
as possible.  Thus, the debate is no longer whether
health care should be rationed; rather, how to ration it
equitably.
The presumption that old age hinders the possibility
of favorable medical outcomes may be accurate
statistically but remains a highly undependable clinical
outcome predictor.  What must be considered is that
older people are generally, as a population,
physiologically and psychologically very different.  As
such, curtailing treatments pursuant to an arbitrary,
age-based policy will not result in the most efficient
use of medical resources and fails to recognize
individual human potential.30
The Equal Opportunity Argument
Empirical studies make immediately apparent that,
given the rate at which the number of elderly and their
needs are increasing, no society has available all the
resources necessary to completely fulfill these needs.
With age based rationing, however, the aim of equal
access to health care is ostensibly achieved in that,
with the passage of time, individuals inevitably move
through the various stages of life.  Furthermore, the
opportunity to live out one’s life is understood to
include such aspects as work, love, procreation and
raising a family and enjoying life with others.
Assessing the aged members of society, most have
experienced these opportunities of life.  As such, age
based rationing does in essence provide elder citizens
with the same opportunities afforded to younger
citizens.31
One such age based health rationing plan sets forth
the goal of guaranteeing a minimally decent level of
health care for all while limiting the private demands
of ailing elders.  Specifically, the plan proposes to cut
off all but the most basic medical care at the age of
eighty.  This policy would be instituted through the
Medicare/Medicaid system and would refuse
consistently to fund intensive treatment beyond the
established age limit.32   It is argued that such a plan
is both decent and manageable and that only through
such an active plan can society avoid a genuinely serious
crisis in health care costs.
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Elderly Discrimination
Promoting age-based rationing is detrimental to the
elderly in that it devalues the status of older people
and caters to the values of a youth-oriented culture in
which negative stereotyping based on age is
prevalent.  Age based rationing carries the danger of
signaling to society that the old are not as respected
as the young.  In addition, denial of life-extending
treatment to the elderly may foster the growing trend
of unequal respect towards the elderly.33
Unequal access to basic goods and services
promotes inequality and is demeaning to those who
are excluded.  Medical treatment, however, is not a
good resource that can be conserved in the same
manner that other goods or resources can.  It is
morally unacceptable to ration beneficial health care
except in the most extreme of situations.  Thus,
medical treatment cannot ethically be denied from
any predetermined segment of the population based
on age.  Such a denial could, in essence, be denying
patients life itself.  The factor determining the propriety
of medical treatment should therefore be the patient’s
condition, and not an artificial criterion such as age or
status.34
III. PATIENT DUMPING
Although patients in ‘right to refuse medical treatment’
cases have trouble terminating their medical care,
many persons have difficulty obtaining medical care
in the first place because they are refused admission
to hospitals. This problem is termed ‘patient
dumping.’35
Also known as ‘demarketing of services’ or
‘management of patient mix,’36  patient dumping refers
to the hospital practice of transferring or refusing to
treat persons who are indigent, uninsured, or
otherwise undesirable to admit.37   Patient dumping
has origins in the common law no-duty rule.38   This
rules provides that hospitals have no duty to admit and
treat all patients who seek care and, in some cases,
have no duty even to specify reasons for rejecting
patients.39   Hospitals often ‘dump’ patients who arrive at
hospital wards either without any health insurance or with
only Medicaid insurance—a program which physicians
know provides low reimbursement payments.
The economic pressures placed upon hospitals over
the past decade increased the frequency of patient
dumping in cases falling under the no-duty rule.40
This rule and the ability of hospitals to refuse medical
treatment have been limited by the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of
198641  and the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA)42 —an amendment to
COBRA.
In the final analysis, it will be seen that the elderly will be
secure from the indignity of patient dumping only when
society and the health care industry acknowledge their
inherent value as an important segment of contemporary
American life.
Ethical Obligations to Treat the Elderly
In a society where the elderly are more susceptible to
illness and disability than any other age group,43  they
‘ought to command special attention in matters
pertaining to health care.’44   Clearly, access to
hospitals and health care resources is an important
concern to them.45   Many in fact have Medicare, or
private insurance, or both; but many others have
neither.  As with society as a whole, the elderly
population is composed of persons having various
income levels, interests, and needs.46   Even if
society’s ethical consensus advocated unlimited
access to health care, health care providers would
still be unlikely to provide health care to persons
unable to pay for it.47   Patient dumping and access to
health care remain prominent issues for the elderly
because elderly persons are not typically
economically productive.48   Indeed, the population of
elderly is impoverished disproportionately and
disadvantaged economically.49
Some physicians and patients have adopted a
consumerist image of the physician as an independent
contractor who sells his knowledge and skill to patients
who demand care.50   This contractual model of
medical care51  overlooks the moral and ethical
considerations inherent within an emergency patient-
physician situation and belittles the idea that a doctor
should make ‘a correct technological (medical) choice
consonant with a patient’s needs and desires.’52   In
addition, for-profit hospitals face an inelastic demand
for services, which contributes ultimately to their being
unresponsive to altruistic social winds.53
Americans should be offended particularly by hospitals’
dumping elderly patients because the elderly are
characterized as recruited to poverty after relatively
decent working lives.54   An elderly person’s ‘social worth’
and corresponding health care resource allocation should
not be determined by his ability to be a rational
consumer55  who has saved money to purchase healthful
retirement years.  Instead, health care should be
allocated by considering the fairness to the persons who
need care the most—specifically, the sick and indigent
elderly.
When society allows health care providers to operate
and profit in any community, an ethic of fairness—
which respects the wisdom,56  self respect,57  and
achievement of the elderly—should be in place and,
indeed, controlling.58   Respect for the dignity and
autonomy of elderly patients, as well as the underlying
motive to help them, must replace the all consuming profit
Elder Law Review  Vol 1 (2002)
23
motive held by both hospitals and physicians as the
lodestar for American health care delivery.  In order to
reach this goal, society should restrict medical licenses
to health care providers who will care for the indigent
elderly as a condition for doing business with the rest of
society.  Only then might the incidence of dumping elderly
patients be diminished significantly.
IV. WHO SHOULD DECIDE?
The ultimate decision on the merits of age based
rationing and the provision of life extending care is
linked directly to society’s perception of health care
for the elderly and society’s medical capabilities.  This
decision making process inevitably introduces value
considerations into policy formulations, specifically
into the policy surrounding the allocation of expensive
health care resources for the elderly.  Allowing values
to be a factor may hinder ultimately the resource
allocation planning process.  Nevertheless,
safeguarding the personal values of older Americans
may require such a compromise.59
Formulating a national policy on health care
requirements of the aging presents inevitable value
conflicts.  There exists a common perception that the
transfer of social resources essentially polarizes the
younger and older generations.60   Nevertheless, such
an intergenerational clashing of values must not be
viewed as an obstacle.  Rather, the rational resolution
of competing health care policy considerations
demands that conflicting values be scrutinized and
through some factor interlinked with one another.  It
must be remembered that values generally serve as
self-justifying ordering and selecting principles unless
they are evaluated critically and impartially.  Thus,
regardless of how objective an approach society takes
towards constructing an equitable national policy on
health care allocation to the elderly, the competing
value concerns must be addressed in an orderly,
critical and reasonable way.  The tool for allowing
society to undertake such a critical evaluation is
ethics.61
Ethics is an unparalleled regulator of value selection and
must therefore be factored into the formulation of a
national elderly health care policy.  The American Medical
Association’s Principle of Ethics, for instance, states
clearly that notwithstanding the societal interest in
containing health care costs, ‘concern for the care the
patient receives will be the physician’s first
consideration.’62   The weighing of the ethical aspects
of medical decision making for the elderly would
indicate how aggressive treatments or intervention
should be in prolonging a life otherwise viewed as
having limited potential.63
Conclusions
Ultimately, in order to confront the issue of health care
rationing for the elderly, society must integrate effectively
the disciplines of moral and ethical reasoning with the
quantitative formulations of needs and resources.  Such
an effort, supported by an abundance of public debate
and discussion, will result in an equitable policy on elderly
health care rationing with long-term viability.  Until such
a point, however, the greatest danger to avoid is the
perpetuation of ‘nondecisions’ regarding health care
treatment for the elderly that are being made daily.  Such
‘decisions’ all too frequently result in the nontreatment of
elderly patients and institutional residents because of an
inability to assess effectively the equitable and efficient
allocation of the scarce health care resources.64
If the proposition that the ‘simple and compact’ rules
of the common law are a more effective mechanism
for providing health care than legislative and judicial
actions is true,65  an acknowledgment must be made
of the lynchpin of the common law itself: namely, the
normative standard of reasonableness.  And, with this
standard’s implementation comes the utilization of a
rather deceptive balancing test—a test which seeks
to measure the gravity of the harm of a decision against
the social utility (or values) of maintaining the status
quo.66
Placed within the context of distributing health care
resources, this common law balancing approach
forces an evaluation of the competing individual
interests or social values.  Thus, the value and cost to
society of expending health care resources—for
example—to maintain an individual with a futile
medical prognosis—is balanced against the
economic utility of providing care to one whose health
care can either be rehabilitated or restored.67
Age should never be recognized as the determinative
factor in the balancing test for health care services.
Rather, a patient’s condition, informed or negotiated
consent to treatment, together with the primary
physicians professional judgment as to the need for
the commencement or cessation of medical services
should be controlling.  While varying from situation to
situation what is the most efficacious and humane
treatment and in a patient’s best interests is always,
of necessity, a medical  judgment.68
The real moral question raised from this
contemporary debate is not whether too much
treatment or too little is offered.  Rather, ‘it is how to
optimize the appropriateness of the treatment’; and
therein lies the moral obligation of health care as
well.69   However difficult or tragic the allocation
decision is to make, taking no action is perhaps the
most pernicious conduct of all.  Society must realize
that aging is not a disease, but an inherent part of
human life.
Absent a verifiable mechanism for allocating health
care resources to the elderly, rationing may well be
effected over succeeding years by an insidious
allocation process removed from the public view
altogether.  More and more, because of governmental
pressures on the medical profession to control costs
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and to eliminate waste and inefficiency, patient care
becomes secondary to distributive justice with a
physician’s responsibility to advance a patient-
centered ethic thus being compromised by competing
responsibilities to preserve societal resources.70   In
the final analysis, practicing distributive justice at the
bedside—without any clear social and ethical
contours in place—can very well become an arbitrary
process dependent largely on the value system of the
medical gatekeepers.  In a deliberative democracy,
this cannot be allowed to happen.
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